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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * 
DYNAPAC, INC., a Utah corporation 
and TRACY COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
v. 
CASE No. 14243 INNOVATIONS, INC., a Utah corporation, 
JOHtf CUNNINGHAM, and ROBERT E. OVERTREE, 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
* * * * * * 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
DYNAPAC, INC., AND TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
* * * * * * 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought upon a contract for money due 
and owing, for damages for breach of contract, fraud, and/or 
unjust enrichment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondents obtained a default judgment against Robert 
E. Overtree, Appellant herein. Appellant, more than three 
months thereafter, filed an Answer and a Motion for an Order 
setting Aside the Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that the Judgment 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was entered erroneously and because of mistake, inadvertance, 
surprise and excusable neglect. The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
Sr., presiding in the lower court, first granted the Motion 
and then upon a rehearing nullified that Minute Entry and 
reinstated the Judgment, granting Appellant leave to file an 
amended Motion to set aside the Judgment. Appellant then 
refiled his motion moving that the Judgment be set aside 
pursuant to "all of the provisions of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure." Appellant thereafter filed an additional 
Motion to Quash Service of Process against him on the grounds 
that no endorsement of the personfs name, title, and the 
date served was made upon the Summons served upon the Defendant 
as required by Rule 4(j), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. thereafter entered a Memorandum 
Decision finding that Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the 
Default should be denied and that the Judgment should stand. 
The Court thence denied the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 
and the Motion to Quash. From this Order Appellant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents pray that the Order of the Lower court 
denying Appellant's motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment 
and his Motion to Quash Service of Process be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As Appellant's Statement of Facts contains some errors 
and important omissions, Respondents deem it imperative to 
make a Statement of Facts rather than to adopt Appellant's 
Statement of Facts by reference. 
Plaintiff's complaint (the pages of the Complaint have 
become shuffled in the record and are at R.106-114, 117, 
116, 115, 118, 119, 96-98, 99, 94 and 93) set forth eight 
Claims for Relief which are briefly summarized as follows: 
FIRST: That Defendants entered into an Agreement and 
Modification Agreement with Stokermatic (the predecessor to 
Dynapac, Inc.) to the effect that Innovations would pay to 
Stokermatic $40,000.00 for the purchase of certain personal 
property, but that Innovations defaulted on the contract with 
the sum of $38,890.81 owing and being due with interest 
thereon. 
SECOND: That the Defendants have refused and are 
unable to transfer ninety-four percent (94%) of the stock of 
Innovations to Stokermatic as they were obligated to do in 
the event of default and that by reason thereof "Cunningham 
and Overtree are liable to Stokermatic for payment of the 
amount owing pursuant to the Agreement." 
Referring to the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's 
brief, Appellant alleges that there is no obligation set 
forth in Exhibit "B" (the Modification Agreement) which 
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describes any obligation by Appellant as the party thereto. 
Page 2 of said Modification Agreement (R.96) specifically 
provides that Cunningham, Appellant, and Innovations would 
transfer 94% of the outstanding stock of Innovations to 
Stokermatic upon default in payments or insolvency of Innovations. 
THIRD: This claim dealt only with Defendant Cunningham 
is not related to this appeal. 
FOURTH: That Cunningham and Appellant as principal 
officers and directors of Innovations conducted the affairs 
of the Corporation as their alter-ego and as though it were 
their own business and that they have used the Corporation 
"for the purpose of defrauding Stokermatic as hereinabove 
set forth and are therefore personally liable to Stokermatic 
for the Corporate debts of Innovations." 
FIFTH: That Appellant and Cunningham personally guaranteed 
the payment of Innovation's obligation to Stokermatic and 
that they had refused to pay the same. 
SIXTH: That the Defendant Cunningham and Appellant 
wrongfully or mistakenly obtained from American National 
Bank the stock certificates placed in escrow which resulted 
in unjust enrichment to them and that they were liable to 
Respondent Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. (successor by 
merger to the escrow accounts of American National Bank) for 
the return of the stock certificates or the cash equivalent 
thereof as of the date of the release of the stock in the 
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event the stock was then worth less than it was worth when 
the stock was released. 
SEVENTH: That by reason of the release of the stock, 
Appellant and Cunningham were unjustly enriched and that 
Plaintiffs should be compensated and that the reasonable 
value of the benefit to the Defendants was then unknown but 
would become known during the course of this action. 
EIGHTH: That Cunningham and Appellant, as the principal 
officers and directors of the company, disposed of the 
assets of Innovations for less than their fair market value 
in fraud of creditors and that by reason thereof the Defendants 
looted or gutted Innovations of its corporate assets making 
it impossible for Innovations to carry on its business in 
such a way as to enable it to generate income sufficient to 
pay the obligations owing to Stokermatic and that Stokermatic 
made demand upon Cunningham and Appellant for payment of the 
corporate debt but that they had refused to pay the same. 
The Prayer of said complaint asked for judgment against 
the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, in 
the sum of $38,890.81 plus interest thereon, and for judgment 
in favor of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. for the return 
of 107,052 shares of Innovations stock or, in the alternative, 
the value of said stock as of October 23, 1969 in the event 
the stock was then worth less than its value on said date. 
All of the foregoing were abstracted from the Complaint. 
(R.106-113). 
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The following is a chronology of events as they relate 
to Appellant: 
December 7, 1973; 
January 24, 1974: 
March 25, 1974: 
May 19, 1974: 
May 20, 1974: 
August 19, 1974 
September 9, 1974 
December 18, 1974: 
December 26, 1974: 
April 2, 1975: 
April 30, 1975: 
May 1, 1975: 
Complaint filed. 
Appellant served. (R.105) 
Default Certificate filed (R.85) 
Default Judgment entered. (R.84) 
Notice of Judgment sent to> i 
Appellant (R.80, 82, 83). 
Appellant filed an Answer (R.64-66) 
and a Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1) 
(R.67). 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
was heard and granted by Minute 
Entry (R.53). 
Motion to Set Aside reheard on 
Stipulation, Minute Entry nullified, 
Default Judgment reinstated, 
Appellant given five (5) days to 
file an Amended Motion to Set Aside, 
said Amended Motion to be deemed to 
have been filed on August 19, 1974. 
(R.42, 43). 
Amended Motion "pursuant to all of 
the provisions of Rule 60 (b)" was 
filed (R.37, 38). 
Motion to Quash Service of Process 
filed (R.32). 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
and Quash Service of Process were 
heard. 
Memorandum Decision was filed 
stating that both motions should be 
denied. 
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August 1, 1975: Order entered denying Appellants 
Motions to Set Aside and to Quash. 
(R.22). 
August 8, 1975; Motion to Amend Order of August 1, 
l 9 7 5^ f i l e d ( R # 1 3 # 1 4 J # 
August 14, 1975; Motion to Amend denied by 
Minute Entry (R.ll). 
It should be noted that Appellant's Answer and Motion 
to Set Aside under Rule 60(b)(1) were filed more than three 
(3) months after the Default Judgment was entered. The 
motion was made on the basis that the judgment was entered 
erroneously and because of mistake, inadvertance, surprise 
and excuseable neglect. Neither the Answer nor the Motion 
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the person due 
to faulty service of process. 
The Judgment by Default recited that "judgment is 
hereby entered against said Defendant, Robert E. Overtree, 
pursuant to the Prayer of Complaint on file herein." Said 
Default Judgement recited further that "by virtue of the law 
and by reason of the premises aforesaid, it is ordered, 
adjudged, and decreed that said Plaintiffs do recover from 
said Defendant the sum of Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred 
and Fifty-Four Dollars and Sixty-Seven cents ($43,454.67) 
plus interest thereon at the rate of eight percent (8%) per 
annum until paid, and for costs of suit." (R.75). 
An Affidavit (R.61, 62} was filed with Appellant's 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment which alleged essentially 
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that the Appellant was served on or about the 24th day of 
January, 1974, and had referred the matter to an attorney in 
Utah, Delwin Pond, with instructions for Mr. Pond to file an 
Answer on Affiant's behalf. Said Affidavit alleged that 
about thirty (30) days thereafter Appellant called Mr. Pond 
to inquire as to the status of the matter and Mr. Pond 
informed him that he no longer wished to represent him and 
that an Answer had not been filed. The Affidavit further 
alleged that Appellant contacted Gordon Roberts, one of the 
attorneys for Plaintiffs, and requested an extension of time 
to file the Answer and that Mr. Roberts stated to Appellant 
that before any default would be entered he would give 
Appellant notice of his intention to take a default. No 
affidavit by Mr. Pond was filed to verify the allegations of 
Appellant in his affidavit. 
The Affidavit of Respondents1 attorney, Gordon L. 
Roberts, in opposition to the Affidavit of Appellant was 
filed with the Court on September 6, 1974, (R.54-56), wherein 
Mr. Roberts stated that following the entry of the Default 
on March 25, 1974, but before entry of the Default Judgment, 
he had a telephone conversation with a person purporting to 
be Appellant wherein said person was advised by Mr. Robesrts 
that a Default had in fact been entered, but a Default 
Judgment had not been entered. Appellant was advised that 
before entry of a Default Judgment there would be further 
-8-
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communications. Subsequent thereto, Mr. Roberts, as stated 
in his Affidavit, was contacted by Sumner Hatch, an attorney 
in Salt Lake City, and was advised by Mr. Hatch that he had 
been retained to represent Appellant. Mr. Hatch asked if 
Mr. Roberts would be willing to stipulate to setting aside 
the default and Mr. Roberts stated that he could not stipulate 
to setting aside the default and that Mr. Hatch, if he 
desired, could file a motion to seek that relief. After two 
weeks elapsed and no action was taken, Mr. Roberts called 
Mr. Hatch to ask whether the action was to be taken. Mr. 
Hatch advised Mr. Roberts that he had not received a retainer 
and that as far as he was concerned he was not representing 
Appellant any further. Roberts advised Mr. Hatch that he 
intended to enter a Default Judgment inasmuch as substantial 
time had elapsed since the entry of the default and he owed 
an obligation to his client to proceed with the matter. 
Default Judgment was thereafter entered. Mr. Roberts in his 
Affidavit stated that at no time did he advise Appellant or 
any person purporting to be him that he could have an extension 
of time or that a Default would not be entered and that, in 
fact, at no time prior to the entry of the Default did Mr. 
Roberts have any conversations whatsoever with Appellant. 
On December 17, 1974, Respondents filed the Affidavit 
of Sumner J. Hatch (R.40, 41) which set forth essentially 
that Mr. Hatch had been contacted by Appellant and that they 
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discussed this matter at which time Appellant indicated that 
a default had been entered against him. The affidavit of 
Mr. Hatch stated that the first contact was on April 2, 1974 
and that after reviewing the pleadings Mr. Hatch called Mr. 
Overtree on aproximately April 6th or 7th, 1974 and indicated 
that he thought he could get the default set aside and 
requested a retainer of $650.00. The Affidavit of Mr. Hatch 
states that he did not hear back from Appellant after that. 
Appellant's Amended Motion to Set Aside was filed on 
December 26, 1974, and listed as grounds that Overtree had 
an understanding with Plaintiffs1 counsel that further 
communications from said Counsel would be had before a 
Default was to be entered, and no such communication was 
made, that no written agreement to guarantee any obligation 
of the Defendant, Innovations, Inc., was ever introduced 
into evidence, and that no testimony was adduced at the time 
the Default Judgment was taken to prove any unliquidated sum 
complained by Plaintiff as to the Defendant, that service of 
process should be quashed because of failure to comply with 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the 
Appellant had a good and valid defense to the claims of the 
Plaintiffs. 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson's Memorandum Decision (R.28) 
stated that Appellant's motion was made for the purpose of 
delay and that he had not been misled in any manner. 
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POINT I 
BY FILING AN ANSWER AND A MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
RULE 60(b)(1), APPELLANT SUBMITTED 
HIMSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURT AND WAIVED ANY DEFENSE HE HAD 
FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4(j) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
that: 
"At the time of Service, the person making 
such service shall endorse upon the copy of 
the summons left for the person being served, 
the date upon which the same was served, and 
shall sign his name thereto, and, if an 
officer, add his official title." 
Failure to comply with Rule 4(j) is fatally defective 
when the defendant appears specially and raises the point of 
defective service. Martin v. Nelson, Jr. U.2d , 533 
P.2d 897 (1975), Rees v. Scott, 8 U.2d 134, 329 P.2d 877(1958), 
Thomas v. District Court, 110 U 245, 171 P.2d 667 (1946). 
These cases are in line with Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which requires that every defense be asserted in 
a responsive pleading if one is required except for certain 
defenses, including lack of jurisdiction over the person, 
which may be made by motion. The Rule requires, however, 
that a motion making this defense must be made before pleading 
if a further pleading is permitted. Rule 12(h) specifically 
provides that a party waives all of its defenses which it 
does not present either by motion or, if he has made no 
motion, in his answer or reply. As stated, the first pleadings 
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filed by Appellant were an Answer and a Motion to Set Aside 
the Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1) on the grounds 
that the judgment was entered erroneously and because of 
mistake, inadvertance, surprise and excuseable neglect. 
Neither the Answer nor the Motion raised the issue of lack 
of jurisdiction over the Appellant. By filing the Answer 
and the Motion, Appellant made a general appearance and 
waived the defense that the court lacked jurisdiction over 
him. State Tax Comm. v. Larsen, 100 U. 103, 110 P.2d 558 
(1941). In fact, by filing an Answer Appellant submitted 
himself to the Court's jurisdiction. Barber v. Calder, 
U.2d , 522 P.2d 700 (1974). 
The court in Thomas v. District Court, supra, made it 
abundantly clear that where the requirement of Section 104-
5-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, (now Rule 4(j)) is not 
complied with, the service is fatally defective only when 
timely attacked by motion. The court stated at 110 Utah 251 
that: 
"We have a statute, Sec. 104-5-10, supra, which 
in harmony with these cases, recognize and imply 
that when a defective service of summons is timely 
attacked it should be quashed. It provides inter 
alia that objections to the service be taken by 
motion before pleading to the complaint. I T . As 
early as 1880 this court held that under the statute 
defects of service must be timely raised by motion 
or it would be deemed waived. [Citation omitted]. 
In State Tax Coram, v. Larsen, 100 Utah 103, 110 P.2d 
558, we held that defective service could be attacked 
after default but not after pleading." (Emphasis 
added). 
Significantly, Justice Wolfe in his separate concurring 
opinion in Thomas v. District Court, supra, discussed the 
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question of whether the failure to make the necessary endorsement 
on the copy of the summons left with the defendant made the 
service void or merely voidable so that the Court acquired 
jurisdiction of the defendant but that the jurisdiction was 
vulnerable if timely attacked by motion. He concluded a 
judgment founded on such service was voidable only and that 
defendant by timely and proper attack may have the service 
set aside. He stated at 110 Utah 259 that: 
"Before judgment (absent a general appearance) the 
proper attack was motion to quash the service. Had 
the default been entered — appeal or motion to set 
aside the judgment as provided by Section 104-14-4, 
U.C.A. 1943, or suit in equity to set 
aside the judgment would have been possible 
attacks. However, the service though defective, 
gave the Court jurisdiction of the defendant and had 
a judgment been entered pursuant thereto, it could 
not have been successfully attached collaterally on 
grounds of no jurisdiction of the defendant." 
There is no dispute that the requirements of Rule 4(j) 
were not met. However, due to the general appearance made 
by Appellant, there was a waiver of that defense and it 
necessarily follows that the court below did not err in 
denying the motion to quash service of process and the 
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment filed by Appellant. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN ITS DENIAL OF THE 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT OF THE 
DEFENDANT BECAUSE APPELLANT'S MOTION UNDER 
RULE 60(b) (1) WAS NOT TIMELY MADE AND BECAUSE GROUNDS 
FOR SETTING ASIDE UNDER RULE 60(b)(7) DID NOT EXIST. 
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The record clearly shows that on May 17, 1974, Judgment 
was entered against Appellant,. On May 20, 1974, Appellant 
was sent a Notice of Judgment, Not until August 19, 1974, 
more than three months after judgment was entered, did 
Appellant file his answer and motion to set aside the 
judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b) clearly states 
that a motion filed under subdivision (1) must be filed 
within three months after the entry of the judgment. Apparently 
because of missing the filing deadline, Appellant was allowed 
to file an Amended Motion with such filing to be deemed to 
have been as of the date of the original motion. Appellant 
thence filed an Amended Motion to Set Aside the Default 
pursuant to "all of the provisions of Rule 60(b)" listing as 
grounds for setting aside the judgment the following: 
1. That Appellant conversed with Respondent's 
attorney and had an understanding that no 
judgment would be taken against him without 
notice first being given. 
2. That there was no written agreement ever 
introduced into evidence to support any 
liability of Appellant as a guarantor of the 
obligations of Innovations. 
3. That no testimony was introduced to prove the 
unliquidated sum sued for. 
4. Service of process should be quashed because 
Rule 4 was not complied with. 
5. Appellant had a good and valid defense. 
As to the motion generally, the lower court found and 
recited in its Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Set 
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Aside that Appellantfs actions in proceeding to have the 
judgment set aside were "...actions or tactics for the 
purpose of stalling, and the Court further feels that he was 
not misled in any manner or fashion..." This finding must 
be presumed to be valid and correct and the burden of showing 
that the finding is in error or that it is so seriously 
inequitable that it manifests a clear abuse of discretion by 
the court is upon the Appellant. Warren v, Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 U. 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
The only provisions of Rule 60 (b) that could possibly 
be available to Appellant are subdivision (1), which allows 
relief in the event of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or 
excuseable neglect and subdivision (7) which allows relief 
for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment." As shown, Appellant was not entitled to 
relief under subdivision (1) because he failed to file his 
motion within the three month period allowed. In any case, 
notwithstanding what may or may not have been represented to 
Appellant by Respondents' attorney Gordon Roberts, this 
court has held that an alleged promise by plaintiff's attorney 
to defendant's attorney that he may have additional time to 
answer the complaint, which promise was made after the 
default judgment had been entered, is not binding because 
"such a promise, if given, could in no way bind a client who 
already had a judgment." Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 
at p.420. Respondents submit that the law is the same in the 
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situations where the default of the Defendant has been 
entered but the judgment has not been entered, both the 
default and default judgment being governed by Rule 55. 
This Court in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., supra, stated 
that the Court on Appeal would reverse the trial courtfs 
order denying a motion to set aside the judgment only where 
an abuse of discretion is clearly shown. It discussed the 
conflicting considerations of finality of decisions for 
purposes of res judicata, keeping the prevailing party from 
having to prosecute his case more than once, and enabling 
him to enforce his judgment as soon as possible versus 
allowing the losing party to present his defense. The court 
then stated at 123 U. p.420: 
"However, the movant must show that he used due 
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing 
by circumstances over which he had no control." 
Relating this to the case at bar, Appellants own affidavit 
shows that he was served about January 24, 1974, and referred 
the summons to Attorney Delwin Pond to answer and that about 
thirty (30) days thereafter (about February 24, 1974) he 
contacted Mr. Pond and was informed by Mr. Pond that he no 
longer wished to represent Appellant. Appellant at that 
time, according to his affidavit (or some thirty (30) days 
thereafter (about March 24, 1974) according to Mr. Robert's 
affidavit), conversed with Mr. Roberts about Appellant 
answering the complaint. According to Mr. Roberts, Appellant 
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was then informed that his default had been entered but that 
the judgment had not. According to the affidavit of Sumner 
J. Hatch, he was contacted by Appellant approximately April 
2, 1974, and was asked to represent him. On April 6 or 7, 
1974, Mr. Hatch requested a retainer and agreed to represent 
Appellant. Appellant never contacted Mr. Hatch further 
because apparently he thought the fee was too high. Forty 
days thereafter, on May 17, 1974, a default judgment was 
entered. Not until August 19, 1974 (almost seven months 
after Appellant was served), was an answer and a motion to 
set aside the judgment filed. Certainly, the foregoing shows an 
awareness by Appellant that he was in a very difficult legal 
position. Notwithstanding, Appellant failed for seven 
months after service of the Summons to take the action that 
due diligence required of him. There is no evidence that 
Appellant could not afford to pay a lawyer to file the 
answer. There were no circumstances over which he did not 
have control that prevented him from taking timely and 
appropriate action. In addition, this issue is related to 
matters properly within the provisions of subdivision (1) of 
Rule 60(b) relating to mistake, inadvertance, surprise and 
excuseable neglect, Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., supra, and 
not within subdivision (7), and a motion based on this issue 
was not timely made. Federal courts in dealing with federal 
Rule 60(b)(6), which is the same as Rule 60(b)(7), U.R.C.P., 
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have held that a party cannot bring a matter under subdivision 
(7) if it is within the purview of the other subdivisions of 
the rule. Klapprott v. United States, 338 US 601, 336 US 
942, 695 at 384, 93 L Ed. 266 (1949). Otherwise, the maximum 
time limitation of three months for matters justifying 
relief under subdivision (1) would be meaningless. 7 Moore's 
Federal Practice, 2d. Ed., P.343. 
Appellant states in his brief (page 14-16) that: 
"While these esses represent facts when a motion 
was filed within the three-month period of Rule 
60, this court has always recognized the need for 
setting aside a default for good cause in case 
where the motion was not filed within three (3) 
months such as in the case of Ney v. Harrison, 5 
U.2d 217, 922 P.2d 1115 (1945), where the motion 
to set aside the judgement by the wife a defendant 
who had answered and was contesting the case on 
its merits was granted even though eleven (11) 
months had lapsed from the default judgment to 
the motion to set aside and the reason that the 
wife had not answered is that she felt that a 
divorce decree between her husband and herself 
would protect her. In the instant case, the 
Affidavit of the Defendant, a resident of 
California, which was filed with the motion to 
set aside was dated the 6th day of August, 1974, 
within the three-month period, and the motion 
itself was filed only two (2) days after the 
running of the ninety-day period." 
By making such an argument, Appellant seems to claim 
that the equities involved in this case are substantially 
the same as the equitable considerations in Ney v. Harrison, 
supra, which led that court to set aside the judgment, and 
that the three-month period of Rule 60(b) may be extended by 
the court if the moving party happens to be a few days late 
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in filing his motion. Obviously, neither proposition is 
true. In Ney, the defendant had reasonable grounds to 
believe that she was protected by the decree of divorce. In 
this case, Appellant had notice of the entry of the default 
and of the entry of the judgment, and knew or should have 
known that none of the other defendants were protecting him 
in the litigation. In fact, Appellant had contacted two 
attorneys about representing him. Appellant failed to take 
any action until seven months had elapsed from the time he 
was served. Appellant's entire conduct showed a contemptuous 
disregard of the judicial process and such disregard is 
grounds for denial of a motion to set aside the judgment. 
Weinberger v. Manning, 50 Cal. App. 2d 494, 123 P.2d 531 
(1942). It was not an abuse of discretion on the part of 
the trial court to deny said motion. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
supra. 
The fact that, as pointed out in Appellant's brief, 
little progress had been made against the other personal co-
defendant, Cunningham, is not persuasive because Respondents 
did not feel that it was necessary to push the action against 
him since they already had a judgment against Appellant 
which Respondents felt could be fully satisfied upon execution. 
Respondents were under no obligation to continue to prosecute 
the action against Cunningham once they had a judgment 
against Appellant. Also, the fact that Cunningham had been 
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diligent in filing an answer should in no way inure to the 
benefit of the negligent Appellant, 
Appellant also alleges certain defects in the pleadings, 
contending that certain alleged omissions and other alleged 
deficiencies makes the Complaint such that it fails to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. At pages 17 
through 19 of Appellant's brief, Appellant contends that the 
Modification Agreement, escrow agreement, and Exhibits "C" 
and "D" were not attached to Plaintiff's Complaint and that 
allegations based upon these documents are defective. An 
examination of the record indicates that the staple holding 
the Complaint and Exhibits together was removed and the 
pages shuffled with other documents in the record. The 
pages of the Agreement, put in their proper order, are at 
pages 114, 117, 116, 115 and 118 of the record. The pages 
of the Modification Agreement, put in proper order, are at 
pages 119, 96, 97 and 98. The escrow agreement (Exhibit 
"C") is page 99 of the record. The pages of Exhibit "D", 
put in proper order, are pages 94 and 93 of the record. 
Thus, although the record has been shuffled, all of the 
Exhibits referred to in the Complaint were filed with the 
Complaint. Any claimed failure to state a claim or other 
defect based upon failure to attach to the Complaint Exhibits 
referred to therein are clearly unfounded. 
The Second Claim for relief, claiming that pursuant to 
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the Agreements, Appellant, Cunningham, and Innovations were 
obligated to transfer 94% of the stock of Innovations to 
Stokermatic but that they then refused and were in fact 
unable so to do, is clearly sufficient to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
The Fourth Claim for relief, setting forth matters 
intended to allow Plaintiffs to "pierce the corporate veil," 
was likewise sufficient to state a claim. 
The Fifth Claim for relief alleges a personal guarantee 
by Appellant and Cunningham of Innovations obligation and 
need not set forth or allege facts concerning a written 
agreement as such guarantee was a matter of proof at time of 
trial, if necessary. 
The Sixth Claim for relief is not inconsistent with the 
First Claim as Appellant alleges because no allegation is 
made in the First Claim as to Appellant other than that 
Appellant had the obligation, in the event of default, to 
transfer 94% of the stock outstanding of Innovations to 
Stokermatic. The Second Claim states that certain stock was 
in fact put in escrow but that it had been wrongfully or 
mistakenly released to Appellant and Cunningham and that 
they were unjustly enriched at the expense of Tracy Collins 
Bank and Trust Co. by the value of the stock at the time and 
that Tracy Collins Bank and Trust as escrow agent was 
entitled to its return or the value thereof at the time it 
was released. 
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Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
demands for relief in the alternative or for several different 
types of relief. Rule 8(e)(2) allows a party to set forth 
two or more statements of a claim alternatively, either in 
one count or in separate counts. It further provides that: 
"When two or more statements are made in the alternative 
and one of them if made independently would be 
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient 
by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may state as many 
separate claims as he has regardless of consistency 
and whether based on legal or equitable grounds 
or both." 
Rule 8(a) requires only that a pleading setting forth a 
claim for relief contain a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing the pleader entitled to relief and a demand 
for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled 
and Rule 8(e)(1) requires each averment to be simple, concise 
and direct and eliminates technical forms of pleading. 
Respondent submits that all of its claims for relief against 
Appellant were adequate under Rule 8. 
The fact that Defendant's proposed Answer sets forth 
various defenses is immaterial because under Rule 12(h) 
Appellant waived any defenses he could have presented by 
motion or by Answer timely filed. Certainly, an answer 
filed after the default has been entered is without any 
force or effect. Batchelor v. Finn, 109 C.A. 2d 410, 341 
P.2d 803 (1959). 
• • . \i . 
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POINT III 
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE 
AT THE DEFAULT HEARING TO SHOW THE LIABILITY 
OF APPELLANT. 
The complaint states that a specific sum of money was 
then due and owing by Innovations to Respondent Dynapac, and 
that Appellant guaranteed payment of the same, that Appellant 
and Cunningham failed and were unable to deliver to Stokermatic 
(now Dynapac) 94% of the outstanding stock of Innovations 
and were therefore liable for the unpaid balance on the 
contract, that Appellant and Cunningham had used the corporation 
as their alter ego as though it were their own business, 
and for the purpose of defrauding Stokermatic and that they 
were therefore personally liable for the corporate debts of 
Innovations, that they were indebted to Respondent Tracy 
Collins Bank and Trust Co* for the value of the stock mistakenly 
released, that they had been unjustly enriched by the value 
of the stock mistakenly released, and that they had looted 
or gutted the corporation of its corporate assets thereby 
making it impossible for Innovations to pay its debts. The 
prayer asked for judgment against Appellant, jointly and 
severally with the other defendants, of a specific sum plus 
interest and for return of the stock released from escrow 
or, in the alternative, the value of said stock on the day 
it was released. 
Rule 55(b) (2) provides that except where the clerk has 
the authority to enter the judgment on a sum certain and 
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after personal service on defendant, a plaintiff entitled to 
a default judgment shall apply to the court therefore and 
that if, 
"...in order to enable the court to enter judgment 
or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to 
take an account or to determine the amount of 
damages or to establish the truth of any averment 
by evidence or to make an investigation of any 
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings 
or order such references as it deesms necessary 
and proper.1' (Emphasis added). 
Respondents submit that no testimony was necessary 
because the complaint alleged and prayed for a specific 
dollar amount, i.e. a "liquidated sum." A liquidated sum is 
a sum which is determined or fixed or which can be determined 
with exactness by arithmetical process. Hurd v. Ford, 74 
Utah 46, 276 P. 908 (1929). While Respondents may not have 
been entitled to a judgment based upon the unstated value of 
the stock released from escrow, they were entitled to judgment 
based upon breach of contract and their other claims relating 
to the specific sum set forth in the complaint. In essence, 
the amount owing under the contract was as susceptible to 
proof as the balance owing on a promissory note. The amount 
owing on a note is a liquidated sum. Alexander v. McDow 108 
Cal. 25, 41 P.24, cited in Hurd v. Ford, supra. Appellant, 
by default, admitted the material allegations of the complaint 
and plaintiff is not required to establish his cause of action 
by proof. 49 C.J.S., Judgments, §213. Cases in which the 
courts have not allowed a judgment on an unliquidated 
amount primarily involve the award of attorney's fees when 
-24-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the amount prayed for is not stipulated by contract and 
there is no proof to sustain the same. Hurd v. Ford, 
supra, Even Qdds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 U.2d 49, 448 P.2d 709 
(1968), Butler v. Butler, 23 U.2d 259, 461 P.2d 727 (1969), 
Freed Finance Company v. Stoker Motor Company, U.2d , 
537 P.2d 1039 (1975). 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is respectfully urged that the trial 
court did not err in refusing to set aside the Default 
Judgment where the court had jurisdiction over Appellant due 
to his general appearance and his failure to timely move to 
set aside the judgment; that there was no misconduct on the 
part of Respondent's attorneys since the default had been 
entered prior to any contact with Appellant; that Appellant 
waived any defenses he may have had by failing to file a 
timely answer or motion to set aside the judgment; that the 
judgment was rendered for a sum certain prayed for in the 
complaint and no evidence was required. Accordingly, this 
Court should affirm the order of the trial court denying 
Appellant's motions to set aside the judgment and to quash 
service of process. 
DATED thiScT^^Jday of January, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
byOy 
G0RDON L. ROBERTS 
byj//j/U//?/K / . C&toJftXb 
JjHCLLIAM L . CRAWFORD 
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